



E-ISSN: 2789-9500
P-ISSN: 2789-9497
IJCCSL 2023; 3(2): 44-54
© 2023 IJCCSL
www.criminallawjournal.org
Received: 20-06-2023
Accepted: 25-07-2023

Bailey Saleh
Department of Political Science,
University of Maiduguri, Nigeria

Christopher A Abimiku
Department of Economics,
University of Jos, Nigeria

Empirical analysis of electoral violence in Nigeria's fourth republic, 1999-2023

Bailey Saleh and Christopher A Abimiku

Abstract

It is not in doubt that all the six general elections held in Nigeria between 1999 and 2019 were bedeviled by electoral violence that tend to serve as Achilles' heels in the country's democratic consolidation in the Fourth Republic. In spite of pressure from the international community and human right groups in the country for successive political leaderships to eradicate electoral violence in the country; yet the trend is alarmingly on the increase. This portends great dangers for the survival of Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The study is a qualitative one; where document method was adopted and utilized in generating data through secondary sources such as: academic journals, textbooks, internet materials and newspapers. The data was analyzed through discourse method, with empirical aspect analyzed through descriptive and explanatory methods. The concepts of electoral violence/political violence, Pluralist Theory, Frustration Aggression Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory and Realist Theory have been defined and clarified that served as frameworks for the study. Principal among the recommendations is that the immunity clause be expunged from Nigeria's constitution.

Keywords: Electoral, empirical, fatality, polling, post-election, pre-election, violence

Introduction

The return of Nigeria to civil democratic rule in 1999 was widely greeted with much enthusiasm and euphoria, if not for anything but for the easing away of the military from political power. Electoral process preceding the general elections of 1999 was devoid of manifest and glaring violence. However, the story was not the same for electoral processes leading to the 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 general elections in the country. Political office holders (elected and appointed) after tasting the sweetness of political power that goes with fame, prosperity and affluence, and taking advantage of the very weak Nigerian 1999 Constitution (as amended) embarked on widespread corruption and culture of impunity. With these statutory lacunae and hiatus (inherent in the 1999 Constitution [as amended]), these ill-equipped political office holders armed with huge stolen public funds resorted to the employment of any means to secure their positions in subsequent elections.

In view of the above, the electoral processes leading to the remaining five general elections in the country starting with the 2003 elections were marred with electoral violence, political violence and socio-economic violence. Political gladiators clandestinely started recruiting and arming political thugs under heavy influence of drugs to unleash mayhem on perceived and manifest opponents and opposition elements in order to secure their seats or to terrorize and win new states for their political parties. All these reigns of terror for the retention and securing of new political office set the stage for more serious electoral violence to come Nigeria's way.

The activities of these political thug groups under different unregistered names in most states of the Federation created unsettled political and electoral conditions in the country. Among these political thug groups are – Yankalare in Gombe state, Sara-suka in Bauchi state, Bani-Israila in Taraba state, Ecomog in Borno state, Bakassi in Anambra state, Yantauri in Kano state, etc. The violence unleashed by these political thug groups resulted in the assassination of prominent Nigerians to include late Bola Ige Nigeria's Minister of Justice, General Mamman Shuwa (rtd) from Borno state and Joshua Kala Chief of Staff to the Taraba state government among others. Apart from the massacre of these prominent citizens, many incidences of electoral violence have been recorded throughout the country between 1999 and 2019 with very high numbers of fatality as well as destruction of property (Saleh, 2009; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022) [36, 8].

Corresponding Author:
Bailey Saleh
Department of Political Science,
University of Maiduguri, Nigeria

The study is a qualitative one where document method was adopted in generating data through the scrutiny of secondary sources such as books, academic journals, newspapers and internet facilities. The data generated was analyzed through discourse and explanatory methods. The concepts of electoral violence (political violence), pluralist theory, relative deprivation theory and realist theory have been defined and clarified that served as frameworks for the study. At the end of the study, recommendations have been made towards eradicating electoral violence in Nigeria's democratic environment. Principal among which, is the need for realistic constitutional review (amendment) that will expunge the immunity clause and impose capital punishment for corruption and mismanagement of public resources.

Conceptual Frameworks

Electoral Violence

Electoral violence includes any act or threat of coercion, intimidation or physical harm perpetrated with the aim of affecting an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition. The separate views of scholars such as Azuka and Adesote & Abimbola see electoral violence as a sub-type of political violence and as a means of controlling and or oppressing an individual's right or group's right to participate in political processes and institutions. This is attained through the use of emotional, social and economic force, coercion or pressure; as well as physical and sexual harm. It may take place in public or in private including in the family, the general community, online and via those orchestrated by the state (Azuka, 2021; Adesote & Abimbola, 2012) ^[9, 44].

The views of Alao and Eya seem to align with the above views, where they describe electoral violence as an attempt to destabilize the election process and also a physical attack on election materials, electoral officials, the electorates and other participants in the election process. According to them, violence in an electoral process involves the threat or use of physical force with the intent of injuring, killing and intimidating others in an election process. That other aspects of electoral violence include destruction of all kinds with a view to inflicting emotional/psychological injury and economic loss on opponents or their supporters. More aspects of electoral violence include threat, terror, assassinations, disruptions of political and electoral processes, blackmailing and other general negative acts that tend to jeopardize the electoral system and electoral process (Alao, 2021 and Eya (2003) ^[5, 16].

On its part, the United Nations' Policy on Preventing and Mitigating Election-related Violence (UN-PPMEV), defines electoral violence as a form of political violence which is often designed to influence an electoral outcome and therefore of the subsequent distribution of political power. In addition, the Policy upholds that the manifestation of violence can occur during all the different phases of the electoral cycle; where the political order has not managed to achieve a balance between competing political interests more generally (UN-PPMEV, 2016). This last statement implies outright leadership failures.

Conceptualization and discussion of electoral violence will not be adequate without the description of the typologies of electoral violence. Hence, three types of electoral violence are currently discernable to include – pre-election violence, polling violence and post-election violence as outlined and discussed below:

Pre-election violence

This usually occurs during pre-electoral processes leading to elections (voting) such as voter registration, campaigning, party primary elections, movements of logistics and electoral materials to voting centers, as well as movement of electoral officials. Electoral violence can be perpetrated at this stage by hired political thugs to attack, bomb and terrorize areas that the party of their paymasters have few followership or weak support. It is carried out to terrorize, intimidate and create psychological fear to opponents, their supporters and the electorates; as well as to violently rock the boat of the general election. It is also intended to cow and sway the supporters of their opponents away from their original parties and candidates well ahead of the polling day (voting day) (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017) ^[12].

Polling Violence

It refers to electoral violence that take place on the polling day (election day [voting & collation day]). Such electoral violence include - the bombing of election material stores/warehouses, destruction of election materials on transit or at polling centers, destruction of electoral offices and vehicles. Other polling day electoral violence are snatching of ballot boxes/papers, firing of gunshots at voting and collation centers, stuffing of ballot boxes with pre-thumbed ballot papers, arsons, inflicting injuries, killings, assassinations and twisting of election results (Azuka, 2021) ^[9].

Post-election violence

It refers to electoral violence that take place after the announcement of election results and declaration of winners under heavy dispute. It can happen almost immediately after the announcement of results and declaration of winners or it can take hours, days, months after failed formal resolutions or litigations. The post-election violence is usually spontaneous and the most pervasive with very serious consequences on the citizens and the nation. It can be more dangerous and threatening when it assumes ethnic, religious and sectional dimensions as is usually the case with Nigeria. It always includes wide scale arsons, killing of people and the suffocation of the national economy. In extreme cases, it can lead to regime-change and the violent shaking of the country's sovereign foundation (Alao, 2021; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022) ^[5, 8].

Pluralist Theory

Proponents of the Pluralist Theory such as Baskin (1970) ^[11], Polsby (1980) ^[45], Perry (1991) ^[34] and Longley (2019) ^[26] are of the views that conflict is inevitable in a pluralist political society where various factions compete against one another for political power, which is further used to patronize members of the groups. They also uphold that social heterogeneity prevents any single group from gaining dominance. They in their separate views, contend that politics is essentially a matter of aggregating preferences. This means that coalitions are inherently unstable such that competition is easily preserved.

The theory offers partial explanation of election violence in Nigeria, where competition for political power often takes the form of ethnic, religious or sectional coloration; and where political parties are formed along these sub-national lines. For example, in the 2015 and 2019 general elections, the PDP while the APC represents the interests of the North-North dominated Muslims with moderate South-Western Muslims.

This serialization along religious lines, serve as a fertile ground for electoral violence to thrive (Longley, 2019) ^[26]. Other adherents of the Pluralist Theories such as Charles F. Andrian and David E. Apter view politics as a game where competing teams of rival groups struggle for victory; where agreement on the rules of the game brings order. They also uphold that political actors often devise strategies to achieve success where they rely on both conflict and cooperation to win the game (political power). While, as members of the same political party often coordinate their activities and cooperate with each other in order to achieve success; conflict often occurs in their contact with the opposition party. Under this situation, intense conflict often results in the event of a zero-sum game (win-lose). Whereas, more intense intra-party and inter-party conflicts often occur in the situation of a negative-sum game (lose-lose) (Andrian & Apter, 1995) ^[7].

Frustration Aggression Theory

This theory believes that the primary source of the human capacity for crisis of violence is the frustration aggression theory. It believes that the anger induced by frustration is the motivating force that disposes men to aggression irrespective of its instrumentalities. The frustration aggression theorists, also upholds that if frustration is sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is swiftly manifested or highly likely to occur. That people who are frustrated, have an innate disposition to do violence or cause crisis to its source in proportion to the intensity of their frustration (Johannes & Malte, 2017) ^[17].

Even when the Frustration Aggression Theory appears appropriate as framework for this study, yet it is not quite suitable because most of the direct perpetrators of electoral violence are not those seeking for elective office themselves; rather they are mostly those hired by the political gladiators to do the dirty jobs for them. Hence, there is no linkage between the perpetrators of electoral violence (mostly thugs) and the Frustration Aggression Theory.

Relative Deprivation Theory

The Relative Deprivation Theory is a theory that explains the subjective dissatisfaction caused by one person's relative position to the situation or position of another. The pressure of society to which people belong – encourages them to participate in political and socio-economic activities. When this is not possible, a person begins to compare his or her own position with the situation or position of another. For many people, relative deprivation means lack of resources or time to support certain lifestyles, activities and amenities that individuals or groups have become accustomed to. Poverty and social exclusion are features associated with Relative Deprivation Theory. The term is used in social sciences to express feelings or forms of economic, social or political deprivations. Relative Deprivation Theory is often cited as the major reason for the emergence of social movements, which in the extreme leads to politics, riots, revolution and war. (Smith, et-al, 2012; Johannes & Malte, 2017; Janse, 2020) ^[38, 17, 21].

For the benefit of hindsight, the emergence of Relative Deprivation Theory is associated with two American Sociologists Garry Runciman and Ted Robert Gurr (1934). Both stressed on fraternal deprivation, selfish deprivation and frustration aggression mechanism to explain the Relative Deprivation Theory. They went on to add that if an obstacle or barrier is placed on the way of people that obstructs or

hinders them from achieving their demands and goals, they will be subject to relative deprivation. In this situation, they uphold that the natural response of those obstructed or hindered is to damage the source of the barrier.

In furtherance of the above, it was Ted Robert Gurr who brought into focus the linkage between political (electoral) violence and Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) to which he did in his book – “Why Men Rebel”. In this book, Gurr succinctly explains the linkage between Relative Deprivation and political violence; and further discusses why people commit political violence and how regimes respond to violence. Gurr who is not favorably disposed towards frustration aggression as the main source of electoral violence further examines in the book whether the primary source of the human capacity for violence is frustration, which the Frustration Aggression Theory posits. He concluded that frustration does not always lead to violence, but if someone or a group is/are exposed to frustration for a long time, it often leads to anger and ultimately violence (Gurr, 1970) ^[18].

Though this study concurs with the views of Gurr above on the linkage between deprivation and electoral violence as a pent-up energy, yet it should be stated that very few political violence is a function of response or reaction towards damaging and clearing sources of barriers caused by prolonged deprivation. None-the-less, the theory is appropriate as a theoretical framework for analysis of limited numbers of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

Realist Theory

The Realists believed that there were laws of political behaviors by nations, and one of such laws is that states are always seeking to increase their power or to maximize it. If this is true, then nation states must perpetually be in conflict. They then concluded that conflict is unavoidable in international relations to the extent that conflict and the struggle for power characterized international relations. The second law was that dominant states are always pursuing their selfish national interests. The third law was that although helpful lessons can be learnt from war, it cannot be completely removed from international relations.

One of the leading exponents of the Realist Theory is Hans Morgenthau (1978) ^[28], who argued that the pursuit of power is the major rationale for state behaviour, and that ‘might take right’. Such that state actors are not concerned with morality; because that is defined by them in line with their national interests. In line with his position, most if not all Nigerian politicians (1999-2022) always doesn't care a hoot about morality so long they can terrorize the electorates through electoral violence and manipulate election results so as win the election and capture political power with the accompanying wealth. Other exponents of this school such as Mazrui (1995) ^[27], Stoeissinger (1979) ^[40], Snidal (1985) ^[39] and Calleo (1987) ^[13]; all stressed on selfish, immoral and predatory motives for struggles for political power by politicians to increase their prosperity and fame. Their collective views explain the reason behind the senseless and wanton destruction of lives and property during incidences of electoral violence sponsored by these lumpen politicians.

Causes of Electoral Violence

There are myriads of causes of electoral violence in Nigeria's nascent civil democratic dispensation. Some of these include – the 1999 Nigerian constitution (as amended), lumpen politicians & Leadership Failures, corruption & impunity,

prependal politics & spoils system, tenure elongation & sit-tight syndrome and poverty & unemployment, as outlined and discussed below:

The 1999 Constitution (as amended)

Due to the political pressure to ease out the military from power, the one-year transition programme of General Abdulsalam Abubakar hadn't enough time to draw up a constitution that will serve the interest of the masses. Hence, what we have as the 1999 Constitution (as amended), is nothing but the 1995 Abatcha-drawn Constitution meant for his self-succession bid that was revised and adopted. Those that revised it for adoption as the 1999 Constitution did it with selfish motives; such that what we have at the end is an elitist constitution; which is completely out of tune with the wishes and aspirations of the masses. Hence, the section on immunity clause has served and will continue to serve as the main trigger of electoral violence in Nigeria's electoral process and electoral system. The immunity clause as a constitutional lacuna; is an automatic license for political office holders to amass ill-gotten wealth without being questioned. As such, the struggle for political power, which translates into automatic fame, affluence and prosperity, has set a very dangerous stage for electoral violence to thrive in the country (Eya, 2003; Saleh, 2009) ^[16, 36].

Lumpen Politicians and Leadership Failures

The collection of those that were hurriedly put together by General Abubakar to revise the old Constitution for adoption; lacked the expertise to do so. The voices of the experts among them were overwhelmed by those of the majority who were in the lumpen side; with most of them nursing the hope and ambition for political power. Hence, what we have at the end as the 1999 Constitution (now as amended) is nothing, but a statutory document for the recycling of lumpen politicians. This has resulted into very low annual rating of Nigeria by the Transparency International; where the country is among the top highly corrupt countries of the world according to the transparency index. The election of ex-convicts such as James Ibori as governor of Delta state, attest to this. The very poor performance of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) with selective prosecution of mostly political opponents explains the lumpen nature of the country's political leadership. It also serves as another trigger for the furtherance of electoral violence in the country (Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022) ^[8].

Corruption and Impunity

Causes 1 and 2 above have set a comfortable stage for corruption to thrive through primitive accumulation of wealth by Nigeria's Fourth Republic politicians who operated as absolute monarchs under the heavy shield of the Immunity clause. As such, and because of the constitutional lacunae and hiatus (Immunity clause), the lumpen politicians find it expedient to deploy culture of violence and impunity to clear their way to capture political power for further exploitation, gang-raping and diversion of Nigeria's national wealth into their foreign bank accounts. In order to continue with this public stealing on sustainable basis, the lumpen politicians often embark on deliberate unhealthy political activities that overheat the body polity by hiring political thugs to unleash electoral violence during election periods (electoral processes), since they statutorily control all the instruments of coercion. This negative political tactics for violently winning

elections and capturing political power by the Nigerian politicians of the Fourth Republic; if not curtailed, will serve as effective time - bombs for the destruction of civil democratic rule in the country (Alao, 2021) ^[5].

Prependal Politics and Spoils System

Prependal politics and spoils system, heavily hinged on causes 1, 2 and 3 above are serious causes of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Prependal politics, relate to official positions that are profitable for the incumbent to allocate political offices at public realms. It simply relates to political patronage in a zero-sum game. While, prependalism refers to a political system in which elected officials and government workers feel they have a right to a share of government revenue and which they deploy according to primordial ties (to benefit their supporters, cronies, members of their religion or ethnic groups or their kits and kin). Richard A. Joseph was the first to use the term prependalism to describe patron-clientelism or neo-patrimonialism in Nigerian politics. He is of the views that the theory of prependalism regards offices as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders; who use them to generate material benefits for themselves, their constituents, as well as kits and kin. He maintains that it is because of this patron-client (identity politics) that breeds a lot of corruption and mismanagement of national resources that Nigeria has regularly been one of the lowest ranked nations for political transparency by the Transparency International in its annual Corruption Perception Index (Joseph, 1987; Ogbuene, 2012) ^[23, 30].

Just as perennialism, the spoils system is also called patronage system because the winning political party in a country often rewards its supporters, campaign workers and active party members with political appointments to public offices as well as lucrative capital project contracts. Public officials appointed under this system often embark on activities in support of their ruling party. However, whenever their party loses grip on political power through defeat in an election, all political appointees automatically lose their positions (offices). In Nigeria, the spoils system extends personnel turnover down to routine or sub-ordinate governmental positions. The fact that the spoils system is of American origin, does not limit its practice on the shores of the USA alone. Rather, it is increasingly becoming a vogue to most third world democratizing countries. In Nigeria in particular, the practice of distributing public offices to reward supporters and to strengthen the government of the ruling party is gaining currency (Abegunde, 2007; Ernest, 2018; Cavanaugh, 2012) ^[2, 15, 14].

Both the practices of prependal politics and the spoils system, which were not well managed by the successive political leaderships in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, have not only been part of the causes of electoral violence in the country, but have exacerbated it. The implication of this is that the survival of civil democratic rule in Nigeria's Fourth Republic is increasingly under serious threat.

Tenure Elongation and Sit-tight Syndrome

Tenure elongation and sit-tight syndrome are major causes of electoral violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The attempt by former President Olusegun Obasanjo to extend his tenure beyond 2007 generated a lot of political heat that resulted into myriads of electoral violence across the country. It resulted into serious intra-party and inter-party-political violence and electoral violence. The attempts by political gladiators within

the ruling party People Democratic Party (PDP) and in the opposition to checkmate each other resulted into political turmoil and stampede. A wide gulf was created between Obasanjo and his Vice (Atiku Abubakar); where Obasanjo unsuccessfully orchestrated and supported the move by the National Assembly to impeach Atiku. This also led to the widening of the scope of electoral violence in the country (Saleh, 2009; Abegunde, 2007) ^[36, 2].

Poverty and Unemployment

In spite of the over twenty years of civil democratic governance in Nigeria, it has not translated into realistic poverty amelioration (reduction), nor has it led to employment generation. In fact, recent World Bank Report of March, 2022 released in collaboration with the Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) states that 4 in 10 Nigerians live below the national poverty line (of \$2 US dollars per day); which is very low for citizens of an oil-rich country. Likewise, the rate of unemployment has been soaring to unprecedented heights in the country, which currently (2022) stands at 33%. The money meant to generate employments and eradicate poverty in the past twenty years have been swindled by the failed political leaderships; which they used to finance electoral and political violence in order to maintain their grips on political power. With the deliberate exacerbation of poverty and unemployment among the citizens and more particularly the youths; the lumpen politicians find it easy to buy them cheap and use as canon fodders for the perpetration of electoral violence and political violence in the electoral system (World Bank, 2022; NBS, 2022; Saleh, 2009) ^[43, 29, 36].

Analysis of Electoral Violence between 1999 and 2019

As stated earlier in the introduction, electoral violence was minimal in the electoral process that ushered in the civil democratic rule of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic as from the first general elections in 1999. This explains the low number of incidences and low number of fatalities in the pioneer general elections of 1999 with total of 100 deaths recorded representing 1% of the total fatality of 6,450 recorded between 1999 and 2019 (Bamgbose, 2012; Alao, 2021) ^[29, 5].

Electoral Violence Fatality, 1999-2019

In as much as low fatality rate was recorded during the first general election that brought about the enthronement of civil democratic rule in the country in 1999, the highest fatality of 2,750 representing 42% of the total cumulative of 6,450 was recorded in the 2019 general elections. The second highest fatality of 1,600 representing 24% of the cumulative total for the six general elections was recorded in 2011 general elections. As for pre-election violence fatality, 4,514 deaths were recorded between 1999 and 2019 representing 69% of the cumulative total for the period covered by the study. A total of 816 fatality was recorded in the polling day (election day) violence for the six general elections held in the country; representing 12% for the same period. While for the post-election violence, 1,116 fatality was recorded representing 19% of the cumulative total for the same period. This is in line with the views of Eya, Alemika, Onapajo and Ladan-Baki whose separate views point towards the increasing incidences of electoral violence in the country with the accompanying fatality and destruction of property. They lamented and cautioned that if these ugly trends are not checked and plugged, they will pose potential dangers to the survival of civil democratic rule in the country and of the Fourth Republic itself (Eya, 2003; Alemika, 2011; Onapajo, 2014 and Ladan-Baki, 2016) ^[16, 6, 33, 24].

On the same note with the above scholars, the International Crisis Group in their Africa Report No. 220 warned on impending dangers preceding the 2015 elections in Nigeria. They cautioned that pre-election activities for the 2015 elections in the country are loaded with potential dangers, which if not well handled, can explode into unimaginable violence that can tear the country apart. This warning and many others coming from friends of Nigeria actually helped to whittle the magnitude of all types of electoral violence during the 2015 elections, which made it to record the lowest electoral violence incidences and fatality compared to the 2011 and 2019 general elections (ICG-AR, 2014) ^[20]. The earlier statistics of electoral violence given above in the first paragraph; is once more presented in detail in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 below:

Table 1: Electoral Violence Fatality per Election and by Type between 1999 and 2019


Year	Pre-Election Violence	Polling Violence	Post-Election Violence	Total	%
1999	35	45	15	100	1%
2003	270	100	30	300	4%
2007	150	120	80	450	9%
2011	588	212	800	1,600	24%
2015	1,090	130	30	1,250	19%
2019	2,381	209	160	2,750	43%
Total	4,514	816	1,116	6,450	100%

Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 ^[17]; World Bank, 2022 ^[43]; NBS, 2022 ^[29]; Alao, 2021 ^[5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 ^[9]; ICG, 2014 ^[20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 ^[8].

Table 2: Summary & Breakdown of Electoral Violence Fatality by Election Type, 1999-2019


S. N.	Types of Electoral Violence	Cumulative	APEV	APV	APPV	ATEV	CATV	CAAV	%
1	Pre-Election Violence Fatality	4,514	511	136	186	451	2,150	645	70%
2.	Polling Violence Fatality	816	511	136	186	136	2,150	645	13%
3.	Post-Election Violence Fatality	1,116	511	136	186	186	2,150	645	17%
	Total	6,450	1,533	408	558	793	6,450	1,935	100%

Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 ^[17]; World Bank, 2022 ^[43]; NBS, 2022 ^[29]; Alao, 2021 ^[5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 ^[9]; ICG, 2014 ^[20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 ^[8].



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 [17]; World Bank, 2022 [43]; NBS, 2022 [29]; Alao, 2021 [5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 [9]; ICG, 2014 [20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 [8].

Fig 1: Electoral Violence Fatality by Election Year and by Type for 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 & 2019



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 [17]; World Bank, 2022 [43]; NBS, 2022 [29]; Alao, 2021 [5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 [9]; ICG, 2014 [20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 [8].

Fig 2: Electoral Violence Fatality by Election Year and by Type for 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 & 2019 (in%)

Summary of electoral violence fatality, 1999-2019

Summary of electoral violence fatality per election type for the six general elections held in Nigeria between 1999 and

2019 shows that the average of pre-election violence fatality (APEVF) is 511 with a cumulative total of 1,533. The total average types of electoral violence (ATEV) are 511. The


cumulative average types of electoral violence fatality (CATEV) are 2,150. The cumulative annual average of electoral violence fatality (CAAEV) is 645 with cumulative total of 1,935. While, as stated earlier, the summary also shows that total fatality of 4,514 was recorded as the result of pre-election violence representing 70% of total cumulative fatality of 6,450 for the period covered by the study. Total of 816 fatality was recorded as the result of polling violence (election day violence) representing 13%. While, total of 1,116 fatality was recorded as the result of post-election violence representing 17%. These figures and percentages of electoral violence in Nigeria is in line with the reservation of Eya (2003) [16], Alemika (2011) [6] and Ladan-Baki (2016) [24] cited earlier under Table 1 and Figure 1 above.

Other scholars who also wrote and cautioned on the dangerous trend of electoral violence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic include Ogundiya & Baba (2005) [32], Lawal (2014) [25], Abah & Nwokwu (2015) [1] and Bekoe & Burchard (2017) [12]. These scholars in their separate views warned that if Nigerian politicians are not called to order, the luxurious growth of electoral violence in the country would subsequently overwhelm the electoral system and eventually

scuttle the civil democratic rule.


Good as the warning of all the above scholars are, it will appear a very herculean task to curtail the activities of these lumpen politicians who hatch, deploy and execute electoral violence because of constitutional lacunae and hiatus. Since there is no constitutional provision that stipulates capital punishment for corruption that breeds all these electoral and political violence, and basking under the shield of immunity clause; the stone-faced Nigerian politicians will continue to capitalize on it to unleash further terror on the electorates to manipulate their ways into power or retaining same; if they already have. As such, pragmatic actions are needed from the civil society groups, the intellectuals, journalists and right-thinking Nigerians to rise up and fight for the realistic revision of the Nigerian constitution to include - expunging the immunity clause and capital punishment for corrupt practices and culture of impunity. Unless this is urgently carried out; then the boat of Nigeria’s civil democratic rule is gradually rocking dangerously for capsizing.

The summary of electoral violence fatality by election type is as presented in Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 below:



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 [17]; World Bank, 2022 [43]; NBS, 2022 [29]; Alao, 2021 [5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 [9]; ICG, 2014 [20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 [8].

Fig 3: Summary & Breakdown of Electoral Violence Fatality by Election Type, 1999-2019



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 ^[17]; World Bank, 2022 ^[43]; NBS, 2022 ^[29]; Alao, 2021 ^[5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 ^[9]; ICG, 2014 ^[20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 ^[8].

Fig 4: Summary & Breakdown of Electoral Violence Fatality by Election Type, 1999-2019 (in%)

Electoral Violence Incidences, 1999-2019


Just as it was the case with the electoral violence fatality earlier discussed above, the incidences of electoral violence were low in the first general elections for the Fourth Republic in 1999 where only 146 was recorded representing 11% of the cumulative total of 1,360 for the six general elections. The highest electoral violence incidences of 400 (29%) was recorded in the 2011 general elections. While the three general elections of 2003, 2007 and 2019, recorded between 200 and 300 incidences of electoral violence. The reason for

the relatively low incidences of electoral violence in 2015, which stands at 121 representing 9% of the cumulative total, is attributable to the political maturity of President Goodluck Jonathan who conceded defeat at the polls and congratulated his opponent (Buhari) even before the final results was announced (Onapajo, 2014, Smah, 2008, Alao, 2021; Adeosun, 2014; Ugob, 2004) ^[33, 37, 5, 3, 41]. Detail of this is as presented in Table 3 and Figures 5 and 6 below:

Table 3: Electoral Violence Incidences by Election Type, 1999-2019


Year	Pre-Polling Incidences of Violence	Polling Violence Incidences	Post-Election Incidences of Violence	Total	Percentage
1999	60	40	46	146	11%
2003	110	60	30	200	15%
2007	189	70	10	269	20%
2011	115	85	200	400	29%
2015	65	40	16	121	9%
2019	90	73	61	220	16%
Total	629	368	363	1,360	100%

Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 ^[17]; World Bank, 2022 ^[43]; NBS, 2022 ^[29].



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 ^[17]; World Bank, 2022 ^[43]; NBS, 2022 ^[29]; Alao, 2021 ^[5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 ^[9]; ICG, 2014 ^[20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 ^[8].

Fig 5: Electoral Violence Incidences by Election Type, 1999-2019



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 ^[17]; World Bank, 2022 ^[43]; NBS, 2022 ^[29]; Alao,2021 ^[5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 ^[9]; ICG, 2014 ^[20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 ^[8].

Fig 6: Electoral Violence Incidences by Election, 1999-2019 (in%)

Summary of Electoral Violence Incidences, 1999-2019

Summary of electoral violence incidences for the six general elections of the Fourth Republic shows that pre-elections incidences is the highest with 629 representing 46% of the cumulative total of 1,360 for the period covered by the study. The total of average incidence of violence per election stands 226 representing 17% of the cumulative total. The average of type of electoral violence incidences stands 453 with total of


1,365. The cumulative average of type of electoral violence incidences is 226 with total 678 representing 50% of the cumulative total. While the cumulative annual average of electoral violence incidences stands 68 with total of 204 representing 15% of the cumulative total for the 20 years of Nigeria’s civil democratic rule (Alao, 2021) ^[5].

Detail of this is as presented in Table 3 and Figures 7 and 8 below:

Table 4: Summary of Electoral Violence Incidences by Type of Election, 1999-2019


S/N	Electoral Violence Incidences	Cumulative	AIPE	ATVI	CATVI	CAAI	%
1.	Pre-Election Violence Incidences	629	105	453	226	68	46%
2.	Polling Violence Incidences	368	61	453	226	68	27%
3.	Post-Election Violence Incidences	363	60	453	226	68	27%
	Total	1,360	226	1,365	678	204	100%

Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 ^[17]; World Bank, 2022 ^[43]; NBS, 2022 ^[29]; Alao,2021 ^[5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 ^[9]; ICG, 2014 ^[20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 ^[8].



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 ^[17]; World Bank, 2022 ^[43]; NBS, 2022 ^[29]; Alao,2021 ^[5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 ^[9]; ICG, 2014 ^[20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 ^[8].

Fig 7: Types of Electoral Violence Incidences by Type of Election, 1999-2019



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2022 as adapted from EUEOM, 2019 ^[17]; World Bank, 2022 ^[43]; NBS, 2022 ^[29]; Alao, 2021 ^[5]; HRW, 2019; Azuka, 2021 ^[9]; ICG, 2014 ^[20]; Ani & Ajakorotu, 2022 ^[8].

Fig 8: Electoral Violence Incidences by Type of Election, 1999-2019 (in%)

Conclusions and Recommendations

From the analysis so far, conclusion can be drawn that electoral violence has been on the increase from 1999 to date (2022). The study has established that total of 1,360 electoral violence incidences have been recorded during the six general elections held in Nigeria between 1999 and 2019. While, a total of 3,066 fatality have been recorded from the above incidences for the same period. The study further established that 1,324 electoral fatalities have been recorded from 400 electoral incidences for the 2011 general elections alone, which makes it the highest since the enthronement of civil democratic rule of the Fourth Republic in the country. As for the election type, the study established that a total of 1,134 (37%) pre-election violence fatality have been recorded from 629 (46%) incidences of pre-electoral violence; making it the highest in this regard. With a total cumulative average electoral violence of 1,533 per election representing 50% of the total electoral violence fatality for the six (6) general elections held in the country between 1999 and 2019, it portrays a negative indicator for Nigeria's civil democratic practice. In the same vein, with a total cumulative average electoral violence incidence of 678 representing 50% it is also not good for the country's democratic development. If urgent efforts are not made to curb this ugly trend, it will subsequently scuttle Nigeria's match towards becoming one of the emerging democracies of the world. Therefore, by way of recommendations, the Nigerian Constitution should urgently be reviewed where obnoxious clauses such as the 'immunity clause' should be speedily expunge and capital punishment should be meted to those who have been convicted of corruption and general mismanagement of public resources. In addition, a section on discipline should be included in the reviewed Constitution because it will serve as a concrete base for the implementation of the capital punishment for public thieves. Where possible the trial, conviction and capital punishment should take retrospective effect. This will serve as a very effective deterrent for those lumpen politicians that have nothing to offer for the country except avarice.

References

1. Abah EO, Nwokwu PM. Political Violence and Sustenance of Democracy in Nigeria. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR) JHSS*. 2015;20(1):33-44.
2. Abegunde O. Electoral Politics and Political Violence in Nigeria. In: F. Omotoso (Ed.) *Readings in Political Behaviour*. Ibadan: Johnmof Printers Ltd; c2007.
3. Adeosun AB. Democracy and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Issues and Challenges. *International Journal of Policy and Good Governance*. 2014;2(6):11-17.
4. Adesote SA, Abimbola JA. Electoral Violence and the Survival of Democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: A Historical Perspective. *Canadian Social Science*. 2014;10(3):140-148.
5. Alao AA. Electoral Violence in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Implication for Democratic Development. *Journal of Administrative Science*. 2021;18(2):320-344.
6. Alemika EE. *Post-Election Violence in Nigeria: Emerging Trend and Lesson*. Jos: University of Jos Press; c2011.
7. Andrian C, Apter DE. *Pluralist Theories and Social Groups*. London: Palgrave Macmillan; c1995.
8. Ani KJ, Ajakorotu V. *Elections and Political Violence in Nigeria*. Beach Road-Gateway East, Singapore: Springer Nature; c2022.
9. Azuka IT. Electoral Violence and Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria. *IOSR – Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*. 2021;26(3):48-57.
10. Bamgbose TA. Electoral Violence and Nigeria's 2011 General Elections. *International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities*. 2012;4(1):205-219.
11. Baskin D. *American Pluralism: Theory, Practical and Ideology*. The University of Chicago Press. 1970;32(1):1970.
12. Bekoe DA, Burchard SM. The Contradictions of Electoral Violence: The Effects of Violence on Voter Tuenout in Sub-Saharan Africa. *African Studies Review*. 2017;60(2):73-92.
13. Calleo D. *Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of*

- Western Alliance. New York: Wheatsharf Books; c1987.
14. Cavanaugh M. Theories of Violence: Social Science Perspectives. *Journal of Human Behaviour in the Social Environment*. 2012; 22(5):607-618.
 15. Ernest FK. Prependal Politics and Good Governance in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: A Review. *Public Policy and Administration Research*. 2018;8(12):37-42.
 16. Eya N. Electoral Process, Electoral Malpractice and Electoral Violence. Enugu: Sage Publications Nigeria Ltd; c2003.
 17. EUEOM. Report European Union Election Observer Mission Findings on National Assembly, Presidential, Gubernatorial, and State House of Assembly Elections in Nigeria. Abuja: Nigeria; c2019.
 18. Gurr TR. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press; c1970.
 19. Human Right Watch. Nigeria's Post-Election Violence killed 800. Human Right Watch. Accessed on 25/04/2022; c2011. <https://www.hrw.org/2011/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800>
 20. ICG. Nigeria's Dangerous 2015 Election: Limiting the Violence (Africa Report No. 220). Brussels, Belgium: ICG Publications; c2014.
 21. Janse B. Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT). Accessed on 22/04/2022 from Toolshero; c2020. <https://www.toolshero.com/sociology/relative-deprivation-theory/>
 22. Johannes B, Malte E. Frustration Aggression Theory. In: P. Sturmey (Ed.) *The Wiley Handbook of Violence and Aggression*. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell; c2017.
 23. Joseph RA. Democracy and Prependal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; c1987.
 24. Ladan-Baki IS. Electoral Violence and 2015 General Elections in Nigeria. *Global Journal of Human Social Science*. 2016;16(1)23-19.
 25. Lawal T. Electoral Violence, Democracy and Development in Nigeria. *International Journal of Social Sciences and Communication Studies*. 2014;1(1):13-21.
 26. Longley R. What is Pluralism? Definition and Examples. *Humanities Issues*. ThoughtCo; c2019. www.thoughtco.com
 27. Mazrui A. *Cultural Forces in World History*. Dar Es-Salam. Tanzania: Tanzania University Press; c1995.
 28. Morgenthau H. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (5th Ed). New York: Knopf; c1978.
 29. National Bureau of Statistics. Joint World Bank-National Bureau of Statistics Report on Poverty in Nigeria. Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics Publications; c2022.
 30. Ogbuene A. Prependalism: A Pre-cursor to Security Challenges in Nigeria. *Journal of Policy and Development Studies*. 2012;6(1):90-97.
 31. Ogele EP. Battle on the Ballot: Trends of Electoral Violence and Human Security in Nigeria, 1964-2019. Asian Institute of Research: *Journal of Social and Political Sciences*. 2020;3(3):883-900. <https://www.asianinstituteofresearch.org> retrieved
 32. Ogundiya S, Baba TK. Electoral Violence and the Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. Nigeria Political Association, Lagos; c2005.
 33. Onapajo H. Violence and Votes in Nigeria: The Dominance of Incumbents in the use of Violence to Rig Elections. *Africa Spectrum*. 2014;49(2):27-51.
 34. Perry HL. *Pluralist Theory and National Black Politics in the United States*. Chicago Journals. The Polity, The Journal of the North Easter Political Science Association; c1991, 23(4)
 35. Palsy NW. *Community Power and Political Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale City University Press; c1980.
 36. Saleh B. *Insecurity and Nigeria's Global Image*. Kaduna: Pyla-mak Services Ltd; c2009.
 37. Smah SO. Money Politics and Electoral Violence in Nigeria. In: VAO. Adetula (Ed.), *Money and Politics in Nigeria*. Abuja: Petra Digital Press; c2008.
 38. Smith HJ, Pettigrew TF, Pippin GM, Bialosewicz S. Relative Deprivation: A Theoretical and Meta-Analytic Review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. 2012;16(3):203-232. SAGE.
 39. Snidal D. The Limit of Hegemony Stability Theory. *International Organization*. 1985;10(39):56-73.
 40. Stoessinger JG. *The Might of Nations: World Politics in our Time*. New York: Rambo House; c1979.
 41. Ugob S. Electoral Violence in Nigeria. *Journal of Politics*. 2004;1(1):1-8.
 42. United Nations. *The United Nations Policy on Preventing and Mitigating Election-related Violence*. New York: United Nations Publications; c2016.
 43. World Bank. *World Report on Poverty in Nigeria of March, 2022*. New York: World Bank Publications; c2022.
 44. Abimbola JO, Adesote SA. Domestic terrorism and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, issues and trends: A historical discourse. *Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society*. 2012;4(4):11-29.
 45. Polsby NW. The news media as an alternative to party in the presidential selection process. *Political parties in the eighties*; c1980. p. 50-66.